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Resumen Abstract
En  este  ensayo  reflexiono  sobre  el  primer  tratado 
consagrado a la metafísica de Bruno Latour, la obra de 
Graham  Harman  Prince  of  Networks.  Explico  cómo 
Harman pone de relieve las raíces y principios de la 
filosofía orientada a los objetos latouriana. Asimismo, 
analizo  cómo  Harman  habla  de  la  concepción 
ontológica  de  Latour  desde  un  nuevo  modelo  de 
ocasionalismo  secular  y  desde  una  nueva  forma  de 
realismo,  el  relacionismo.  Sin  embargo,  Harman  no 
sólo defiende con entusiasmo la metafísica de Latour. 
Este  filósofo  compara  su  posición  metafísica, 
comprometida con una teoría cuádruple, con la teoría 
simple de la  realidad latouriana.  Asimismo,  evalúo la 
revisión  que  Harman  realiza  de  la  obra  de  Latour  y 
defiendo que algunos problemas del filósofo francés se 
comprenden mejor si son explicados desde la filosofía 
de la ciencia. Abordo brevemente esta tarea en lo que 
atañe a la concepción del ocasionalismo de Latour.
In this essay I  focus on Graham Harman’s Prince of  
Networks, the first treatise entirely devoted to address  
the metaphysics of Bruno Latour. I explain how Harman 
highlights  the  philosophical  roots  and  principles  of  
latourian  object-oriented  philosophy.  Furthermore,  I  
analyze how Harman emphasizes both a new secular  
occasionalism as well as the new form of realism within  
Latour’s  conception of  reality featured as relationism.  
Besides,  I  also  stress  that  Harman  does  not  only  
defend the philosophy of  Latour  enthusiastically.  This 
philosopher  compares  his  own  metaphysical  
commitments and his fourfold  theory of  reality to  the  
one-fold theory found at Latour’s philosophy. Finally, I  
assess Harman’s review of Bruno Latour’s work and I  
argue that some problems within Latour’s conception of  
reality are better understood when they happen to be 
explained in terms of the philosophy of science. I tackle 
briefly  this  task  in  what  concerns  the  very  
comprehension of Latour’s occasionalism. 
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New reading of Bruno Latour’s work
Graham Harman’s book,  Prince of Networks: Bruno Latour and Metaphysics (2009), is the first treatise 
devoted entirely to address the metaphysics of Latour. The point of departure of Harman’s research is the 
idea  that  Bruno  Latour  is  better  known  by  his  philosophy  of  science  than  by  his  metaphysics. 
Nevertheless, since his early works, this French anthropologist, sociologist and philosopher has tackled 
an array of metaphysical principles which were improving in form and depth meaning-wise throughout his 
career, Bruno Latour (1984/2001). In this sense, the Prince of networks, Bruno Latour, has been the first  
philosopher to formulate new grounds for an object-oriented philosophy.
225
Object-oriented philosophy and the comprehension of scientific realitiesEssay Review
In fact, as a sociologist and anthropologist of science and technology, Bruno Latour has developed a  
great  deal  of  philosophical  reflections  which  inspired  most  of  his  methodological  principles  for  his 
empirical  research.  Most  of  Latour’s  philosophical  work  is  gathered  around  ontology  if  we  broadly 
understand “ontology” as a “theory of reality.” In this context, the central thesis of a-modernity is perhaps 
the best example of Latour’s ontological interests. Not only does this sociologist and anthropologist want 
us to understand the narrative of our culture in a new way, but  he also stresses the necessity of  a 
different grasp of reality, (Latour, 1990, 1991). Latour argues that we do not live in a modern culture 
where science reveals the secrets of nature while technology uses scientific knowledge to control our  
environment since scientific facts and technological artifacts are made of the same material as in any 
other cultural and natural reality. In addition, this philosopher states that things are constructed due to the 
co-participation of what is considered the “raw material” of reality: human and non-human actors. In sum, 
the empirical study of scientific and technological realities in order to understand and interpret our  a-
modern culture– and questions such as  who we are and  what we want– requires the adoption of new 
philosophical principles.
As a result of those philosophical statements, the practical consequences of Latourian principles are the 
new methodological principles for the study of scientific and technological realities (Latour, 1987). This 
new approach, called Actor-Network Theory, adopted some intuitions from other approaches on science 
and technology, but it remains independent concerning the interpretation of objects and facts (Latour, 
1999a).  Furthermore,  the  theoretical  consequences  of  Latourian  principles  are  the  formulation  and 
consolidation of a wide range of anthropological, political and philosophical projects, namely, a Symmetric  
Anthropology of Cultures (1991); a Political Epistemology (1999b); a Diplomatic Anthropology, (2004a); a 
Second Empiricism, (2005a, p. 115) or a Dingpolitik (2005b). This article will only focus on some of those 
projects.
Harman’s book Prince of Networks develops the metaphysics of Latour from two different perspectives. 
The first is found in the first section of the book entitled “The Metaphysic of Latour” and consists of the  
explanation of some key concepts and principles of Latour’s metaphysics through the analysis of his main 
books, such as Irreductions; Science in Action; We Have Never Been Modern and Pandora’s Hope. The 
second one, found in the section “Objects and Relations,” reflects, in criticism, the scope and limits of 
Latour object-oriented philosophy from the fourfold articulation of Graham Harman’s requirement for such 
metaphysics.  Briefly,  Harman  will  re-interpret  the  one-fold  theory  of  Latour  in  a  new  scheme  that 
distinguishes “real” and “sensual objects.” In spite of the one-dimensional theory of actors found in Latour,  
this book addresses the necessity of broadening the very principles of our metaphysics. 
In what follows, I briefly analyze some of the key concepts and principles that Harman identifies to be at  
the base of the metaphysics of Latour. This philosopher refuses some of those latourian principles in  
order to articulate his own program of an object-oriented philosophy. However, this attempt to define a  
better scheme for such a philosophical program ignores, first of all, how latourian projects have evolved 
and how Latour intertwines his metaphysical principles with his projects in philosophy,  sociology and 
anthropology of science. The result  of that intertwinement is a broaden approach to reality than that 
described by Harman. Therefore, I argue that those principles are better understood when they happen to 
be explained in relation to anthropological,  sociological  and political  projects found in Bruno Latour’s  
work.
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Secondly, Harman interprets Latourian theory of causation as a new defense of a secular occasionalism,  
assessed by Harman as the best achievement of the history of metaphysics in recent years (2009, p. 
112). Harman assumes that the metaphysics of Latour is a new kind of realist theory, which is called 
relationism. However, this type of realism is undeniably far from being clear. Harman’s treatment of such 
concept doesn’t deal with all the problems related to this position. In this sense, I argue that the problems 
posed by such a theory of reality demand an analysis of the perspective of the philosophy of science, not  
only in terms of metaphysics. Accordingly, I argue that, firstly, we could reach a better comprehension of  
the role of metaphysics in Latour anthropological, sociological and political projects and, secondly, it will  
also be easier to understand some problems which remain in Latour’s conception of reality and which are 
not explained in Harman’s principles on the metaphysic of Latour. 
On substance
The metaphysics of Latour develops a theory of reality where substances are understood in terms of 
human  and  non-human  actors.  Those  “raw  materials”  of  reality  combine  themselves  and  create 
associations  in  order  to  construct  a  new reality.  The  way actors  assemble  is  explained  in  terms of  
translation of their interests. For instance, the fabrication, distribution and sale of a vaccine for N1H1 
swine flu create association between medical policy, patients, the public, and the illness. Why the vaccine  
was conceived is understandable in terms of the interest to fight the illness. Why countries design medical 
policies for vaccination is understandable in terms of the interest to protect the population against a new 
virus. 
Harman’s book pays special attention to Latourian studies on Pasteur because there we find one of the  
profoundest  analyses of  substance of  the French philosopher.  In this  sense, Latour’s classical  study 
about  microbes on Pasteur’s  research  shows that  there  were  unknown causes that  produced cattle  
diseases, troubled farmers and challenged scientific minds. Those different situations generated different 
interests that Pasteur’s research had to gather upon facing the fabrication of bacillus anthracis (anthrax) 
in his laboratory. For the French biologist, the reproduction of the bacillus in experimental conditions was 
the previous step of the creation of a vaccine for the cattle disease. In order to succeed, Pasteur had to 
convince political institutions that his research was fruitful, as proved by the reduction of diseases. The 
approach of Latour stresses the way Pasteur and the bacillus were creating a network where farmers, 
cattle, vet, bacillus, disease and Pasteur’s lab were associated. Briefly, the association between Pasteur  
and the microbes allows the former to understand what microbes were and the latter how to obey to  
experimental conditions (Latour, 1983, 1984/2001, 1999b). 
Furthermore, Harman highlights that there is no place for philosophical concepts as essence, accidents or 
endurance in  the Latourian comprehension of  reality.  Thus scientific  facts  and technological  artifacts 
should be understood as a complex process of fabrication of networks that might have been constructed 
in a different way.
We can summarize Harman’s statements about the metaphysics of Latour in the four following principles:
1. A principle of irreduction.
2. A principle of democracy between actors.
3. A principle of vicarious causation.
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4. A principle of pragmatic definition of reality.
Firstly,  there is  the principle  of  irreduction found in  the book  Irreductions  (Latour,  1984/2001),  which 
states that everything is related and attached to everything else due to mediation. The way actors interact  
with each other translates their interests and search to reach alliances with other actors. Latour calls this  
process  translation, and it replaces the idea that actors are reducible to anything else. In this sense, 
Latour doesn’t conceive that Pasteur discovered in the lab a real entity which was called microbe. On the 
contrary, Pasteur, his lab, the bacillus, politics and society worked together in order to create a new reality  
that was the cause of cattle disease.
Secondly, the principle of democracy is based on the idea than human and non-human actors have to be 
treated  in  a  symmetrical  way (Latour,  1999b,  1999c).  In  effect,  this  interpretation  of  the  democracy 
between human and non-human actors is at the core of Latour’s metaphysics. Scientific facts do not  
reveal the hidden structure of natural reality because human actors –as Pasteur, farmers, politicians and 
vets– are co-participating with non-human actors –as the unknown substance, the lab instrumental, the 
experimental practices, the cattle, political institutions and statistics– in the construction of a new entity. In 
this context, no single reality can be taken for granted since everything is fabricated. Empirical studies 
carried out by Actor-Network Theory describe how this construction process has been deployed (Latour,  
1984/2001,  1987,  1992).  In  sum,  Latour  believes  that  there  is  not  a  scientific  discovery  of  a  real  
substance which  is  independent  of  the  experimental  conditions  where  this  substance  is  scientifically 
known or certificated by scientific, political and social institutions or by the public themselves. As a result  
of  this,  scientific  research  carried  out  by  Pasteur  not  only  can  be  explained  in  terms  of  Pasteur 
intelligence, but it  also has to be understood in terms of the associations created inside and outside  
Pasteur’s lab. Latour calls this a realism-constructivist approach (1999b).
Thirdly, Harman pays special attention in chapter three to the Latourian idea that entities have to be 
understood as black boxes. Scientific facts, conceived as a concrete association among human and non-
human actors, can change their attachments. In this sense, new associations of actors can create new 
realities.  Therefore,  what  is  a  reality  is  nothing than the number  of  its  components and the type of  
associations among them. For instance, if people refuse massively to get vaccinated against the swine 
flu, a consequence will be a decrease in the perception of the risks associated to the illness or mistrust in  
the efficacy of  vaccination.  The relations between the swine flu  and the medical  policy  will  become 
weaker.  On  the  other  hand,  if  people  accept  to  be  vaccinated,  the  former  will  strengthen  their  
associations. 
Bruno Latour rejects naturalism as philosophical position where causes are understood exclusively as 
“physical causes” (Harman, 2009, p. 108). In fact, Latour criticizes naturalism as a metaphysical thesis at  
the core of what he calls modern narrative as opposed to a-modern world. In  We Have Never Been 
Modern, (Latour, 1991), the French philosopher argues that modern narrative is a type of self-knowledge 
of  western  culture  where  there  is  a  split  between  natural  and  socio-cultural  realm,  objectivity  and 
subjectivity,  facts  and  interests.  Of  a  modern  perspective,  science  is  an  intellectual  activity  which  
discovers the rational structure of the natural world. Consequently, physical causes, settled by scientific  
knowledge, can explain how the natural world is. Since Nature and Culture, subjectivity and objectivity, 
and facts and interests are not conceived in a different way in Latour’s theory, it makes no sense to break  
down the principle of democracy between actors mentioned above and to reserve the exclusive realm of 
Nature for science. In order to explain entities, there is neither an intellectual activity nor a specific Culture 
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that could completely assume the task of defining reality. In fact, there is not one Nature or only one  
truthfully  representation  of  Nature.  Latour  identifies  naturalism  as  a  position  with  a  wider  scope  in 
philosophy and sociology of science. Moreover, he assesses naturalism as a kind of absolutism in which 
reality is reducible to physical causes, (Latour, 1999c/2004, 2004b). On the contrary, Latour argues that 
all kind of actors can be articulated in the construction of reality. Harman interprets Latour as ascribing a  
theory  of  vicarious  causation  that  embraces  all  kind  of  things,  even  if  they  were  not  previously 
reassembled (Harman, 2009, p. 15). 
Finally, an entity is not only defined by the list of its components or the concrete associations between the  
actors attached in a specific network. An entity is also defined by a pragmatic criterion: something is real 
if it has consequences and reflects actual reality. Latour argues that when a network is robust enough it  
has a performative force which is able to reshape the way human and non-human actors behave and 
understand themselves (1983). As a result, better networks are those which have more attachments to 
very different  kinds of actors. Harman’s work on the metaphysics of  Latour shows explicitly  how the  
philosophy  of  the  French  author  is  original  and  is  also  enlarging  and  broadening  the  history  of  
metaphysics.
Nevertheless, Harman does not only defend the philosophy of Latour enthusiastically. He also remarks,  
on the one hand, that there is philosophical tension between the Latourian claim that to find out more 
about a scientific or a technological artifact we need to investigate the attachments of its components  
from a democratic point of view of actors and the claim that something is real if it has consequences and 
transform other things, (Harman, 2009, p. 106). On the other, Harman amply treats the problem posed by 
the  lack  of  differentiation  between  primary  and  secondary  qualities  within  Latour  work.  Finally,  the 
analysis of Harman deals with the best way to interpret realism as a philosophical position that Latour 
defends.  In  this  sense,  Harman tries to  find out  if  latourian realism is  a  case of  correlationism,  the 
philosophical position that refuses the pre-existence of a world in itself before humans as Meillassoux 
argues (Harman, 2009, p. 123), or if Latour’s work fits better the so called relationism, a position which  
focuses on the links created by human and non-human actors within a specific network (Harman, 2009, p. 
129). This last problem will be reviewed after the analysis of latourian secular occasionalism in the next  
section.  As it  will  be  argued,  such a problem could  be better  understood  from the point  of  view of  
philosophy of science and not only from a metaphysical approach.
New secularist occasionalism
Harman stresses in his book that Bruno Latour is better known for his philosophy of science than for his 
metaphysics (Harman, 2009, p. 33). But the Latourian conception of an entity refers to both types of  
philosophical analyses. In fact, in his early anthropological, sociological and philosophical works, Latour 
paid  more  attention  to  methodological  principles  to  describe  the  construction  of  scientific  and 
technological facts than to ontological principles which were suitable to talk about our reality.  This is  
found,  for  instance,  in  works such as  Science in  Action (Latour,  1987) or  Aramis  and the Loves of  
Technology (1992). One of the main purposes of Latour was to define a new methodology for the study of  
science and technology from the point of view of their processes and practices. Rationalism and idealism 
were two philosophical backgrounds that Latour wanted to avoid (1999a). But later, at the fin de siècle  
and at the beginning of the twenty-first century, he emphasizes the proper way to understand any reality 
and its relations to other realities in a political way and in a non-modern context (1999c/2004, 2003,  
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2004a, 2005b). This feature is ignored in The Prince of Networks. In his book, Harman only interprets the 
fact that in Latour’s theory, an entity can be defined by its components and associations in terms of a 
local and secular occasionalist explanation (Harman, 2009, p. 116). This emphasis in the occasionalist  
account of the latourian metaphysical production is what allows Harman to talk about a new approach in 
metaphysics in recent years due to Latour’s work, namely an object-oriented philosophy. In sum, Harman 
neither deals with the Latourian fight against rationalism nor idealism. Besides, Harman doesn’t explain 
the pivotal role of a-modernity in the metaphysics of Latour. Furthermore, there are three main problems 
with Harman’s approach. Firstly, the scope and profoundness of a secular occasionalist explanation are 
not clear enough. Secondly, latourian theory of causation is not apt to deal with all kind of philosophical  
problems that Latour is committed to, such as the Latourian opposition to an ethnocentric prejudice, the 
myth of progress, and the proposal of a non-modern culture. Unfortunately, this text will not deal with this  
second problem due to limitations in time and space. Finally,  if  it  is  desirable to embrace an object-
oriented philosophy because it promotes a better comprehension of reality, then such a philosophical 
project should best clarify its virtues and cross out all the unfathomable content that still surrounds it. In  
order to explain Harman’s criticism on Latour, I will formulate in the language of the philosophy of science 
the metaphysical statements at stake. Of this perspective, it is easier to remark that the main problem 
found in the metaphysics of Latour is related to his conception of reality. This is further emphasized in the  
next section.
Secular occasionalism as a theory of isolated instants.
The occasionalist approach in philosophy is found in Islamic tradition as well as in modern tradition. It  
refers to the idea that natural causation does not exist. Therefore, the relation between two events must 
be  explained  as  an  action  carried  out  by  the  divinity.  Harman  argues  that  Latour  shares  with  the 
philosophical tradition of occasionalism the idea that actors are cut off from one another. In spite of this, 
Latour disregards the hypothesis that it is necessary to claim that God is attaching actors in a way that  
makes the network works. Due to the fact that Latour defends a theory that forbids the interpretation of 
Nature as a set of realities defined by their essence, his theory implies that an entity, understood as  
something concrete, is no more than actors that start up in isolated instants. If things are black-boxes and 
do not have durability, the question which comes to mind is: what are the criteria for defining realities? 
What do they consist of? Harman’s reading insists on the number of actors, the attachments among 
them, the robustness of the network and the effects or consequences of that network. But in order to 
avoid an infinite regress of actors to explain what is a X entity –a problem implied by the Latourian idea 
that durable entities do not exist– Harman identifies a pragmatic definition for an entity. A substance is  
defined by its actions and consequences,  as we have seen in the previous section. Latour’s secular 
occasionalist explanation is a theory of isolated instants that interact without the help of any divinity. An 
entity is considered within this theory as a network formed by attachments of human and non-human 
actors that have effects in reality and reshape the previous ontology. 
Relationism, correlationism, fact-constructivism and realism-constructivist
First  of all,  occasionalist  explanation for Latour’s definition of an entity leads to the understanding of 
realism within the metaphysics of the French philosopher. Harman doesn’t agree with the double criterion 
Latour uses to define an entity: the number of actors and their associations, on the one hand, the effect of  
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the former in the reality, on the other. Firstly, Harman proposes to distinguish between entities and their  
pieces: “In short, things must be partially separated from their mutual articulations”, (Harman, 2009, p, 
131). As a consequence of this, Harman rejects the relationist theory within the metaphysics of Latour 
(Harman, 2009, p. 162). There are two main reasons for this: on the one hand, a relationist theory leads 
us to a theory of isolated instants, thus, it generates a problem of regress to infinite for defining a concrete 
reality.  As  Latour  states,  entities  must  be  understood  in  terms  of  black-boxes  that  can  always  be 
reopened. On the other hand, this theory is not able to explain the problem of change: “Entities for Latour  
must  be a perpetual perishing, since they cannot survive even the tiniest  change in their  properties” 
(Harman, 2009, p. 104).
The former summarizes Harman’s ideas on the apparently realistic theory Latour would be defending.  
Much of the controversy surrounding the French philosopher’s ideas on a realistic conception of entities  
has stemmed from science warriors –as Alan Sokal and Jean Bricmont (1998) – as well as supporters of  
analytic philosophy (Boghossian, 2006). This group of intellectuals has in common the idea that Bruno 
Latour as a great spokesperson of Social Studies of Science represents a challenge to scientific realism.  
For Paul Boghossian, Latour defends an epistemological principle of  equal validity  in  terms of which 
Pasteur’s  knowledge on cattle disease caused by  anthrax  and farmer’s  knowledge on cattle disease 
would have the same reliability (Boghossian, 2006, p. 2). Besides, as the analytical philosopher states, 
the counterpart of this epistemological relativism would be a denial of an independent reality for entities  
from human knowledge. This is what the analytic philosopher calls a  fact-constructivism  (Boghossian, 
2006, pp. 26-27).  Boghossian’s assessment of the philosophy of Latour is, in this sense, negative. He 
considers  that  Latourian proposals  are  counterintuitive  and bizarre.  The  example  brought  up by the 
analytical philosopher focuses on the death of Ramses II and not on the works of Latour on Pasteur. But  
those examples share the same topic, namely, how to understand a realistic conception in the philosophy 
of science. For Latour, Ramses II did not die of tuberculosis because this sickness was not known before 
the  research  done  on  it  by  R.  Koch  in  the  nineteenth  century.  This  leads  us  to  the  correlationist  
interpretation of Latour’s intellectual production that Harman wants to escape from. Nevertheless, when it  
comes to explain the historicity of an event or an entity, Latour fits better with this correlationist approach  
than with the relationist one. The correlationist traits of the Latourian theory work to stress that even if all  
kind of entities are constructed by the same “raw material” –human and non-human actors– there are 
degrees of reality which depend on the robustness of a particular network of actors, or a black-box, and 
the consequences in performing pre-existent ontology by that network or black-box (Latour, 1987). It is 
true that Latour makes a mixture of relationism and correlationism and defines reality, on the one hand,  
by  the  co-participation  of  actors  in  the  construction  of  a  robust  network  and,  on  the  other,  by  the 
consequences of such a network. Harman highlights this ambivalence in the metaphysics of the French 
philosopher: most of the time, Latourian realism can be exclusively understood in terms of relationism, but 
few times, it is necessary to explain Latourian realism in the terms of correlationism. The key concept to 
understand why this happens is that for Latour scientific facts cannot be understood if we cut off its inner 
features  –what  was  supposedly  considered  as  its  substance–  and  its  outer  features  –what  was 
considered as its social and cultural consequences–. The composition of the network of tuberculosis and 
anthrax and the strength of  those black-boxes were different  before and after  Koch’s  and Pasteur’s 
research. As a consequence of this, although unnoticed by Harman, relationism and correlationism alone 
are unable to deal with Latour’s definition of entities. In effect, the realism-constructivist account proposed 
by the French philosopher insists on the idea that  a reality does not  exist  before the research for it 
(anthrax  was not real before Pasteur’s research) but a reality is also independent of such a research. 
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Some of those Latourian statements can be considered counterintuitive from the point of view of the 
philosophy  of  science  because  statements  coming  from realism differ  from constructivist  ones.  The 
former entails that entities are independent of the way they have been stated (Newton-Smith, 1981). The 
latter focuses on the socio-political  factors that caused scientific beliefs and the social  elements that  
shape epistemological  criteria (Hesse, 1980).  Secondly,  Latour  defines his own production as a new 
empiricism which differs from normal empiricism because skepticism is avoided (Latour, 2005a). But, on 
the one hand, from the point of view of the philosophy of science, realism is opposed to empiricism. On  
the other,  Latour  is  defending a  new kind of  epistemology that  deals  with  a special  realist  account, 
realism in media res, as Ofer Gal suggests (2002, p. 535). Escaping from a representational theory of 
scientific  knowledge  and  from a  radical  constructionism of  scientific  facts,  Latour’s  account  tries  to 
understand the emergence of a reality from a symmetrical point of view of its causes. 
Real and Sensual objects
Harman agrees with supporters of scientific realism that in order to define  anthrax  or tuberculosis, we 
should believe that those realities are independent of the process of their representations, although his 
main  influence  in  philosophy  comes  from  the  continental  metaphysics,  not  from  the  branch  of  the 
philosophy of science. In this sense, Harman also distinguishes between “real” and “sensual objects.” The 
former refers to an autonomous real object which differs from its qualities and which is independent of our  
representations of it. As Harman states as a principle of his object-oriented philosophy: “Objects exceed 
our access to them” (Harman, 2009, p. 163). This refers to the existence of an object as it is perceived 
and we pay them heed. Due to this difference between an object and its features and the difference  
between real and sensual objects, Harman formulates his fourfold theory. His object-oriented philosophy 
does not refer to the description of the construction of any fact, but to the distinction of two types of  
objects and two types of traits to render our theory of reality more reliable. For instance, we have the 
bacillus, the object itself, and the sensual bacillus worked in the lab by Pasteur. Besides, the bacillus can 
be differentiated from its qualities and, for instance, from its effects on cattle, farmer, and politicians. 
Harman’s project does not inherit from Latour the principle of democracy between actors. In spite of what  
Harman considers a flat ontology within Latourian theory, he agrees with supporters of scientific realism 
that  there are real  objects independent from our knowledge or our perception of  them. Furthermore, 
Harman rejects the idea that any actor can be linked to another. The association between them can only 
occur when they happen to be two actors of different kind, one from the “real object” and other from the 
“sensual” one because: “We have the real sunflower (assuming it exists) and the sensual translation of it  
that appears to human or other entities” (Harman, 2009, p. 207). 
Therefore, there are big differences between the metaphysics of Latour of an object-oriented philosophy 
and the metaphysics of Harman. This philosopher identifies the very problem of Latourian principle of  
relationism because this principle fails in its attempt to support a realistic theory of reality.  However, 
Harman states that vicarious causation –the position he identifies in the metaphysics of Latour– is one of  
the most important features in the Latourian secular occasionalism. One problem arises from this view 
due to the fact that Harman’s interpretation of vicarious causation is formulated in order to explain how 
any actor can be linked to anyone else. The former was at the core of the very principle of latourian 
relationism. But Harman, as we have said, will not support relationism nor latourian theory of causation –
even if the latourian theory of vicarious causation is formulated within Latour’s first secular occasionalism 
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in  the  history  of  philosophy,  as  Harman  argues,  and  is  in  line  with  the  idea  of  an  object-oriented 
philosophy, perhaps the most original Latourian philosophical project–. In addition, Harman divides things 
in real objects and sensual ones, and qualities of real objects and qualities of sensual ones. Therefore, if  
we want to explain what something is, as Harman states, we should pay attention to the fact that real 
things  exceed our  access  to  them and that  we  will  notice  “real  things”  through  their  emergence  in  
“sensual objects.” So, if Harman doesn’t embrace the Latourian theory of causation, why does he still  
justify such a theory? And if an object-oriented philosophy excludes relationism, which is at the core of  
the  Latourian  occasionalism,  why  would  the  Latourian  approach  of  a  secular  occasionalism  be  so 
important for future metaphysics? 
On realism
There are two different approaches for a new philosophical project within the works of Bruno Latour and 
his commentator Graham Harman. The former defends a one-fold metaphysical system where the tiniest 
ontological pieces were called actors. An atom is an actor as well as the Leaned Tower of Pisa. The latter 
defends a fourfold metaphysical system. Even if it is not feasible to grasp “real objects”, we experience 
their emergence through “sensual objects”. Besides, Harman refuses the idea that a reality is the sum of  
its pieces or its qualities. The question that arises from this situation is: Is occasionalism the best theory 
to fit Latourian realism? And if so, why would it be worthy to defend the originality of such a position if we  
think, as Harman does, that relationism deserves to be avoided?
The main problem with a secular occasionalist  approach, from the point of view of the philosophy of 
science, is that the reasons why a network of actors works remain unfathomable. A further research 
about the concrete associations of actors within that network, the empirical task carried out by the Actor-
Network-Theory,  allows a  better  understanding  of  such  a  situation,  even  if  this  account  can  still  be 
problematic in what concerns the conception of the reality of an entity. So, firstly, I argue that Latour’s 
own definition on the aims, scope and methods of researching the construction of realities is clearer than 
the occasionalist characterization of Harman. Secondly, I assume that the strategy that Harman uses in 
order to deal with Latourian realism, namely an occasionalist approach, could be replaced by a historicist  
approach, as Gal suggests (2002); even though this position would entail some drawbacks.
Many years ago, sociologist Karin Knorr-Cetina (1985) suggested that the research on science carried 
out  by  Bruno  Latour  was  fruitful  detailing  social  and  political  factors  surrounding  the  process  of  
construction of scientific facts. She also argued that we can hardly ever understand, for instance, why 
Pasteur’s replication of the  bacillus  in the lab was a reliable process. In fact, Latour is engaged with a 
symmetrical explanation on scientific and socio-political reliability in the existence of a scientific fact. From 
the point of view of Latour, this is the only way to understand how scientific facts are constructed of  
political, social and economic elements as well as scientific ones. Once this is grasped, it becomes easier  
to understand why scientific facts are very performative because they are made of actors from the social, 
political,  economical  and  scientific  domains.  Harman’s  occasionalist  approach  doesn’t  focus  on  this 
symmetrical process of explanation of reliability in the existence of something from a scientific, social, 
political, economic and cultural point of view. This approach also refuses the principle of symmetry, as we 
have seen before. Besides, an occasionalist approach suggests that a concrete network of actors starts 
to work because a great deal of translation among those actors has been done before. Even if this is a  
truthful  interpretation  of  Latour’s  work,  it  is  very  important  to  focus  on  latourian  meta-thesis  about  
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ontology, namely  a-modernity. Harman’s analysis on Latour’s ontology does not refer to the  a-modern 
thesis which is at the core of Latourian anthropological, sociological and philosophical production. 
From the point of view of a-modernity, no difference exists between an object constructed in a scientific or 
technological  way  and  an  object  fabricated  within  a  non  modern,  industrialist,  pre-scientific  or  non 
informational society. There is, furthermore, an important point which leads Latour’s empirical research 
that  is  also ignored in Harman’s  study,  namely the rejection of  the ethnocentrism.  Latour  considers,  
wrongly in some respects, that the motivation of the philosophy of science as well as the sociology of  
science, before the origins of science studies, were to show how scientific enterprise reveals some kind of  
rational values which serve two useful purposes. On the one hand, those values show that nature is  
intelligible  and  only  understood  in  a  complete  way  by  science.  On  the  other,  that  science  is  an 
achievement of western culture and, therefore, makes that culture superior to other ones. The criticism of  
scientific values considered as the only rational or neutral ones in that they do not include subjective 
interests is an important topic that has received great treatment of different perspectives and disciplines 
(Bloor, 1976; Proctor, 1991; Longino, 1990; Harding, 1995; Haraway, 1996). Latour believes, like Lyotard, 
that the modern assessment of science is based in Trinitarian virtues: “effectiveness, profitability and 
truth” (2004a). At the same time he is against the idea of western cultural progress (1999b). In order to 
prevent an interpretation of scientific and technological realities in a modern way, he defends the thesis of 
the a-modernity where we recognize that pre-modern and the so-called modern construct their realities in 
the same way (Latour, 1990, 1991). If there is no split between nature and culture, objective values and  
subjective ones,  science –as the realm of rational and neutral  values– and politics –as the realm of 
subjective interests–,  the aim of  anthropology  of  science  should  be to  compare  the networks  within  
cultures. This is what the Latourian project of a symmetrical anthropology of modern world consisted in 
(Latour, 1991). This project was removed from his agenda and replaced by a Diplomatic anthropology  
where  modern  and  pre-modern  representations  of  nature  are  considered  equal  and  where  those 
representations have to negotiate in order to reach an agreement on settlement (Latour, 2004a).
As a consequence of this, we learn that there is more than one sociological, anthropological, political, 
historical  or  metaphysical  interest  in  the  Latourian  project,  but  an  entanglement  of  all  this  projects 
reassembled on a-modernity. Harman’s occasionalist explanation for Latourian relationism does not give 
any evidence on all those latourian interests and does not mention the plurality of realities –shaped by a 
culture X, or by a scientific group of culture X or by a culture Y – in a non-modern context that the theory 
of Latour is prompt to accept. And to assess Latour’s work it is necessary to consider all those different  
aspects, even though this task exceeds the aims of this writing. 
Finally, in order to understand Latourian realism, it could be preferable to embrace a historicist approach 
that fits well with a political project within Latour’s conception of reality. Nevertheless, this proposal is 
based on the purposes of interpretation of Latour’s philosophy of science, but it only reflects a provisional  
solution for Latourian realism; this topic would deserve a further analysis.
The new philosophy of science defended by Latour stresses the fact that any object is definable and 
constructed in a plurality of ways or pluriverse (1999c). The principle of equal validity Boghossian applied 
for in order to explain the approach of Latour is working within the French philosopher’s conception of  
reality. However, this principle entails that in order to define reality, all different articulation of realities 
have to  interact  and negotiate  their  meanings,  scope and force.  From this perspective,  the sickness 
caused  by  an  X  substance,  before  Pasteur’s  research  on  anthrax,  was  a  different  reality  from the 
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sickness caused by anthrax, after Pasteur’s research. At that moment, we were able to define in a proper 
way the associations among scientific, medical, hygienic and political actors. Before, those associations 
didn’t exist, even though the effects of an unknown cause on cattle were similar as the effects of anthrax 
on  cattle.  Then  Latour  suggests  that  different  realities  have  to  negotiate  between  them  and  that 
relationism  is a political project committed to the idea of the construction of a  common world (Latour, 
1999c). 
The historicist account that is proposed does not reduce the reality of an entity to its historical roots, even 
if this is the main problem that Gal identifies within Latour’s approach in the philosophy of science. On the 
contrary, the historicist  account, as I understand it,  identifies similarities in different entities that were 
shaped at different moments or even at the same time. This account focuses on the kind of associations  
that started up to work at a certain moment. However, the problem that arises from such a historicist  
account, in my modest opinion, is that if we don’t identify that X substance or anthrax could be all different 
constructions of the one same pre-entity or entity, as Latour does, we would stress and reinforce the idea 
that something is real due to the robustness of the network in which such an entity is described. In this  
sense, Latour is a correlationist for whom reality relates to transformation and redefinition of ontology and 
is dependent to human actors who participate in science, publish scientific articles, decide what type of 
politics are going to be carried out and so on.
Briefly,  on the  one hand,  if  entities  are  not  independent  of  human-actors  and  a realist  approach  is  
avoided,  such  realism defended by  science  warriors,  therefore  Latour  agrees  with  correlationism as 
defended by Meillassoux (Harman, 2009, p. 122). On the other, if bacillus is independent of Pasteur but 
didn’t exist before his research, as Latour argues, then scientific enterprise is better prepared to assume 
the task to define our ontology, even if all different constructions are made of the same “raw material” and 
by the same means, namely, the articulation between human and non-human actors. Latour wants to  
avoid ethnocentrism, but his criteria for assessing scientific or technological facts insist on the robustness 
and force of a network. As a consequence of this, it is not difficult to presume that scientific facts are 
better entrenched than other articulations of reality.
However, I argue that there are some articulations that could be shared by different constructions of the  
same reality. From this perspective, it is more important to pay attention to what is similar, what they are  
for, how they differ and how those different articulations interact in order to define our ontology than to  
discuss  whether  an  entity  is  completely  independent  of  our  knowledge  or  it  does  depend  on  the 
robustness of the network which describes it.  Furthermore,  this idea is  compatible with constructive-
realism account of philosopher of science Ronald Giere (2004) in regard to, firstly, the idea that science 
reflects different models of reality, secondly, science can develop a different kind of models for one same 
real structure of our world and, finally, science does not reveal the hidden essence of reality. 
Therefore, as Latour argues, neither science grasps the substance of the world nor, against Latour, reality  
depends  exclusively  on  different  scientific,  cultural  and  social  constructions.  There  are  also  some 
articulations  or,  in  Giere’s  view,  models  of  reality  which  do  not  depend  on  only  one  deterministic  
representation.
On balance, this new critical lecture of the metaphysics and philosophy of science of Bruno Latour does 
not agree with the fourfold object-oriented philosophy of Graham Harman. First  of all,  I  consider that 
metaphysics is a pivotal philosophical program, but in spite of this, philosophy as an activity transcends  
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the limits of mere speculation about reality. Philosophy has to discuss other empirical disciplines such as 
sociology, anthropology and so on. Harman’s book on Latour brings us the chance to find out more about  
the metaphysics of this great philosopher, sociologist and anthropologist of science. But it fails in what  
concerns the whole of his ontological commitments. 
Secondly, Harman’s fourfold object-oriented philosophy states that “real objects” exceed our knowledge, 
so we find out things about them through their emergence in “sensual objects.” Contrary to Harman, I 
agree  with  Latour  that  ontic-articulations,  entities  or  pre-entities  are  something  more  than  “sensual 
objects”, they can be represented, from the philosophy of science, as different models for reality and, 
from a broader point of view, those ontic-articulations are incarnated in cultural constructions, they have 
different conceptions through time and their understanding and their degree of transformation of reality  
can differ. Even though, those different articulations and conceptions on entities can be related to a pre-
entity that allows comparisons between them. Finally, I think this defense of a plurality of representations 
on the common traces that  different  articulations share,  instead of  drawing a fighting scenery where 
robust constructed scientific networks are prompt to win the war against other weaker scientific or cultural  
networks, could have positive effects in order to deal with the relations between ontology and political  
philosophy of science because Science is not the very Kingdom of the definition of realities.
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